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In this paper we utilise a large and reasonably detailed dataset to show that a greater level 
of democracy in a country's political institutions can alleviate the widely known resource 
curse. Raw material abundance affects per capita growth negatively, an effect that seems to 
work through several different channels. Resource-abundant countries have a lower degree 
of democracy and political rights, and also a lower level of educational attainment. These 
factors inhibit growth. On the other hand, countries with large extractive industries exhibit 
high levels of investment. The effects of resource abundance differ for different raw mate-
rial types, and the largest negative effect on growth appears to come from non-fuel extrac-
tive raw materials. 
 




















* Iikka Korhonen, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition, e-mail: iikka.korhonen@bof.fi 
I would like to thank Nauro F. Campos, Oleh Havrylyshyn and Jukka Pirttilä, as well as the participants of 
BOFIT/CEFIR workshop at the Bank of Finland, for their comments and suggestions. Naturally, any errors 
or omissions are mine.  
 Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
 










Laajan ja yksityiskohtaisen tilastoaineiston avulla tässä työssä osoitetaan, että demokraatti-
nen poliittinen järjestelmä pystyy lieventämään ns. resurssikirouksen vaikutuksia. Maat, 
joilla on paljon raaka-aineita, ovat yleensä kasvaneet hitaammin kuin muut maat. Resurs-
sikirous näyttää vaikuttavan monin tavoin talouskasvuun. Se heikentää demokraattisia in-
stituutioita ja poliittisia oikeuksia. Lisäksi koulutustaso on keskimäärin huonompi niissä 
maissa, joissa on runsaasti raaka-aineita. Nämä tekijät heikentävät talouskasvua. Toisaalta 
maissa, joissa on paljon kaivannaisia,  investoidaan voimakkaasti. Raaka-aineiden  vaiku-
tukset riippuvat myös siitä, millaisia raaka-aineita  maassa on. Kaikkein eniten kasvua 
näyttävät heikentävät muut kuin energiaan liittyvät kaivannaiset. 
 
Asiasanat: talouskasvu, resurssikirous, poikittaisregressio, kehitys, instituutiot 
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1  Introduction and motivation 
 
There is a large body of literature showing that, as a rule, resource-rich developing coun-
tries have grown more slowly than countries less endowed with natural resources (Sachs 
and Warner, 1997; Gylfason and Zoega, 2001). A few countries blessed with abundant 
natural resources, however, have grown rapidly, even over the long run. Botswana, known 
for its diamond riches, is often cited as a developing-country success story. By 1989, dia-
monds accounted for some 80% of Botswana’s exports, yet between 1970 and 2001 Bot-
swana’s per capita GDP averaged 6.4% yearly growth. Among OECD countries, Norway’s 
large oil and natural gas wealth has not prevented it from growing quite rapidly. Given its 
high initial per capita income, Norway’s average annual growth rate of per capita GDP of 
2.8% between 1970 and 2001 is also quite impressive. Apparently, a large resource en-
dowment does not automatically condemn a country to sub-par growth performance. 
In this paper, we examine a large dataset to determine the robustness of previous 
results that correlate growth and natural endowments. Specifically, we want to see whether 
certain political conditions (e.g. societies with extensive political rights and civil liberties) 
are conducive to growth, especially in the case of resource-dependent countries. This issue 
extend beyond simple academic interest in that it has large policy implications. 
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we utilise a larger dataset than 
most previous studies, covering over 100 countries for a period longer than 30 years. Sec-
ond, we use a large array of institutional and political variables in explaining long-term 
growth. Extensive political rights and a high level of democracy in general seem to be 
positively associated with growth. Moreover, political fragmentation, at least in democra-
cies, seems to be beneficial for growth. Such fragmentation may be an indicator of toler-
ance for dissent in an economy, which in turn may be beneficial for innovation and long-
term growth. We also distinguish among types of raw-material resources and find, perhaps 
surprisingly, that non-fuel extractive industries have the largest negative effect on growth. 
This contrasts strongly with the widely held perception that dependence on oil exports is 
detrimental to long-term growth. On the other hand, we also find that fuel exports are 
negatively correlated with level of democracy and civil liberties. 
The second section of the paper starts with a brief literature survey of growth and 
resource dependency. We then discuss a political economy model of resource booms and 
growth developed by Robinson et al. (2002). The third section presents the data. As men-Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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tioned before, we utilise several variables not previously included in this type of analysis. 
Section four presents the main empirical findings along with several robustness checks. 
The fifth section provides concluding discussion of the results. 
 
 
2  Literature survey and sketch of a model 
 
2.1  Literature survey 
 
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of empirical cross-country growth studies. Most 
studies find evidence for conditional convergence among countries, i.e. poorer countries 
tend to grow faster than rich countries conditional on some set of explanatory variables 
(usually related to accumulation of capital, either physical or human). One class of assets 
often seems to contribute negatively to economic growth – natural resources. In particular, 
countries where a large share of their total economic activity involves mineral raw material 
extraction exhibit very low, or even negative, growth rates. One explanation suggested is 
that relatively easy extraction of mineral raw materials or fuels provokes extreme rent-
seeking behaviour. Competition for rents is more profitable than investing in productive 
assets in other parts of the economy, which lowers the overall growth rate. Another view is 
that resource-dependent economies are susceptible to Dutch disease. The success of the 
natural-resource sector crowds out exports from the manufacturing sector by increasing 
demand for non-tradables within the economy. If the non-tradable sector has lower produc-
tivity growth than manufacturing, it leads to lower overall economic growth.  
We begin this section with a brief literature survey of the discussion as it has 
evolved in recent years. Next, we present relevant features of a model developed by Robin-
son et al. (2002). The model suggests that the consequences of a resource boom are cru-
cially governed by the quality of institutions, particularly the constraints they place on poli-
ticians to prevent them from redistributing resource boom gains in an inefficient manner. 
We argue that democratic political systems, i.e. those where people enjoy greater freedom 
of speech and other freedoms, are more likely to have such constraints in place. 
Sachs and Warner (1995 and the paper's revised version in 1997) present evidence 
on the effects of natural resource abundance on economic growth between 1971 and 1989. 
They employ the ratio of primary exports to GDP as their main indicator of natural re-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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source abundance. Their preliminary findings are that conditional convergence has oc-
curred among the countries studied, and that high dependence on primary exports is asso-
ciated with slower growth. The robustness of this result is checked with various indicators 
of resource dependency. Sachs and Warner next investigate the potential channels through 
which resource abundance might affect growth. They find that primary resources do not 
seem to affect the quality of bureaucracy and that the quality of bureaucracy itself does not 
seem to affect the level of investment. Instead, resource abundance seems to affect growth 
more through protective measures that render the economy less open than it would be oth-
erwise. Sachs and Warner postulate that such protective measures are utilised to counter 
the effects of Dutch disease. Unfortunately, when capital markets operate with less-than-
perfectly efficiency, the direct negative effect from resource dependence typically domi-
nates other potential avenues of influence. 
Other studies extend the analysis in other directions. Gylfason and Zoega (2001) 
look at the effects of natural resources on physical investment in detail. They find that 
natural resources lead to lower investment and a smaller financial sector. Also, the level of 
education is lower in resource-rich countries. As education contributes positively to 
growth, raw material abundance is associated with lower growth. Expected rents from the 
natural resource sector decrease the incentive to gain human capital, i.e. invest in educa-
tion. Asea and Lahiri (1999) develop a two-sector model in which natural resources in-
crease rewards to non-skilled labour. This slows investment in human capital and ulti-
mately economic growth. They also present tentative empirical evidence in favour of this 
transmission channel. 
Gylfason and Zoega (2002) show that natural resource abundance is associated with 
higher inequality, which can be harmful for economic growth through its detrimental effect 
on educational attainment. Mehlum et al. (2002) find that an index of institutional quality 
is statistically significant in explaining growth when resource abundance is taken into ac-
count.
1 Their multiplicative interaction term between resource abundance and institutional 
quality is positive for explaining growth, i.e. raw material abundance is good for growth as 
long as the country has business-friendly institutions. On the other hand, the index of insti-
tutional quality only goes back to 1982; the quality of institutions may have been quite dif-
ferent before that. With a reasonably small sample, Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) investi-Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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gate the relative importance of various transmission channels from resource abundance to 
economic growth. They find that the largest negative contribution comes through lower 
investment. Resource-abundant economies are more prone to terms-of-trade shocks, which, 
in turn, produces more violent boom-and-bust cycles. Such uncertainty depresses invest-
ment. Gylfason and Zoega (2001) find that the maturity of the financial system is inversely 
related to the degree of resource abundance. The lack of a developed financial system is 
likely to depress investments further. Papyrakis and Gerlagh find that resource abundance 
affects growth by increasing corruption and decreasing the level of education and interna-
tional openness of an economy. 
Perälä (2003) deepens the analysis by examining different types of raw materials. 
In her analysis, countries that predominantly export fuels and minerals (point-source 
economies) are likely to grow more slowly than countries that export a variety of raw ma-
terials (diffuse economies). This effect is stronger in countries lacking political cohesion. 
Perälä uses a binary variable (from Auty, 2001) to classify point-source economies and dif-
fuse economies. A country is a point-source natural resource economy if it is based largely 
on extraction of minerals or oil, and exports of such products exceed 40% of total exports. 
We reject this definition and use instead a continuous variable to depict resource depend-
ence. We also make finer distinctions among natural resource categories. 
However, some studies at least partially dispute the result that natural resource 
abundance leads to lower growth. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) attribute the apparent 
natural resource curse to developing countries’ debt problems. When prices of raw materi-
als were high in the 1970s, many developing countries were able to borrow from interna-
tional capital markets. When prices of raw materials decreased, these countries had diffi-
culties servicing their debt. The result was lower growth in the 1980s and beyond. Leder-
man and Maloney (2003) argue that natural resources are generally not correlated with 
growth once structure (concentration) of exports is taken into account. However, in some 
of their specifications natural resource abundance is positively correlated with growth. Ex-
port concentration itself is negatively associated with growth, while intra-industry trade 
contributes positively to growth. Both Manzano and Rigobon, and Lederman and Maloney 
employ cross-section and panel estimations in their studies. It is worthwhile to note that 
results of Sachs and Warner do not survive in the panel setting. 
                                                                                                                                                    
1 They use an unweighted average of five indexes based on data from Political Risk Services: rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation and government repudiation of contracts. Their data BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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2.2  Modelling resource booms, economic growth and rent-granting 
 
Robinson et al. (2002) develop a two-period model with two parties.
2 In the first period, 
the politician A is in power, but at the end of the first period the person (or party) in power 
may be turned over through elections to B. Two groups of people, A and B, vote in elec-
tions. The groups are of equal size. Each politician cares about her own utility and that of 
her own group (clan, political party or similar grouping). The economy has a stock of natu-
ral resources, and prices of natural resources are determined in the world markets in both 
periods. In the first period, the physical amount of resources extracted is e, and in the sec-
ond period R(e), with R'<0 and R''<0. The incumbent politician decides e, and how the re-
source rents are allocated between her own consumption, transfers to all citizens and em-
ployment in the public sector. Before the elections, politicians make promises concerning 
these variables in the second period, but in fact they are unable to commit to any specific 
set of policies. After the elections, the politician in power thus consumes the remaining re-
source rents. Voters derive utility (U) only from their own income (Z), U(Zt)=Zt. Income 
consists of wage income (ωt) and transfers (Tt), minus taxes (τt), i.e. Zt=ωt+Tt-τt. Politicians 
derive utility from their own income (which they receive if they are in power), and the in-








t α  
Here Xt is the income of the politician in period t, and 0<α<1 is the weight given to other 
members of the politician's group. Voters can be employed either in the public sector or in 
the private sector. Productivity is assumed to be higher in the private sector, while wages 
in the private sector equal the productivity of private-sector labour, H. Public sector wage 
is W, and the number of people employed in the public sector in period t is Gt. Employ-
ment in the public sector is the way in which politicians in this model distribute resource 
rents to their constituencies. If a voter is employed by the public sector in the first period, 
he can be fired in the second period with a cost of F. Since politicians care about their own 
income more than voters’ incomes, promises of transfers in the second period are not 
                                                                                                                                                    
sample is somewhat shorter than ours (1965-1990). 
2 We present only the very basic structure of the model, leaving out many features inessential to our argu-
ment. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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credible. Similarly, no new public sector employees are hired in the second period, because 
their wages are higher than their productivity (normalised to zero). 
Robinson et al. employ a probabilistic voting model, where each voter i has an 
ideological stance
3 towards the incumbent politician A, σi. The voter supports the incum-
bent if his utility under her rule is higher than in the alternative arrangement, i.e. Zt(A)+σ> 
Zt(B). In the first period, the incumbent chooses public sector wages and employment, re-
source extraction and taxes. In the election, the voters compare their expected utility under 
the two possible regimes and choose the one that maximises their welfare. The politician in 
power in the second period chooses optimal policies (for her) and implements them. Espe-
cially, public sector wages can be renegotiated and public sector employees from the first 
period fired. As no new employees will be hired in the second period, the incumbent can 
credibly promise public sector employment only by hiring public sector employees in the 
first period, and these workers are recruited from the incumbent's own group. Robinson et 
al. show that it is optimal for the incumbent to employ the same number of people in the 
public sector with the same wage also in the second period, provided she stays in the of-
fice. 
For the purposes of this discussion, we concentrate on proposition 4, which states 
that resource booms (i.e. either a permanent or temporary increase in raw material prices) 
may increase or decrease total income. Net present value of the total income Y can be writ-
ten as follows: 
 
) ( ) 1 ( 2 2 1 e R p e p H G Y t + + − =  
 
Productivity of public sector workers has been normalised to zero. Total income therefore 
depends on the production of the private sector (where 1-Gt are employed) in both periods 
and resource rents. The effects of the resource price increase on income can be found by 
differentiating Y with respect to p. The resource boom has three effects on income. First, 
there is the direct positive effect on income through higher prices, since they increase re-
source rents. Second, the boom increases efficiency by moving the extraction path closer to 
the socially optimal path. Incumbent politicians over-extract in the first period because 
there is a positive probability that they are not in the office in the second period. Third, re-
                                                 
3 Uniformly distributed. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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source boom shifts workers away from the private, productive sector to the public sector. 
This decreases income. It is not possible to unambiguously determine the net effect of re-
source boom on income, but some observations can be made. Income is more likely to de-
crease the more the incumbent can affect her re-election probability by increasing public 
sector employment in the first period. In our opinion, this captures an important aspect of 
resource curse in many countries; politicians can distribute the rents extracted from the re-
source sector. Competition for these rents can divert resources from more productive uses. 
If a country has institutions in place constraining the actions of politicians and pre-
venting them from distributing the resource rents inefficiently, it has a better chance of 
benefiting from the resource boom. A wide variety of institutional arrangements can be 
suitable for limiting the power of politicians to grant rents. Robinson et al. (2002) mention 
that institutional quality index of Political Risk Services could provide a good overall 
proxy for such arrangements. However, all such qualities of institutions are highly corre-
lated with the level of democracy in a country. In fact, liberal democracy allows for outside 
checks (such as free press and non-governmental organisations) on the power of politician 
and civil servants. In the long run, such checks may matter more for preventing corruption 
and rent-granting than e.g. the quality of civil servants. We return to this discussion in the 
empirical part of this paper. 
 Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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3  Data 
 
We now briefly discuss the data and their sources. The data can be divided broadly into 
three categories. Economic variables depict economic phenomena, including our central 
variable of interest, growth of per capita GDP. We also employ data on the structure of for-
eign trade (e.g. share of different goods in total exports in GDP), fixed investments and per 
capita GDP at the beginning of the sample period. Social variables describe social con-
ditions in the countries. These include school enrolment ratios. Political variables are re-
lated to the political institutions and outcomes. They include fragmentation of the legisla-
ture, degree of democracy, and political freedoms enjoyed by the population. 
For the economic variables, the main source is the 2003 edition of World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003), or WDI for short. Our main variable 
to be explained is the average growth of per capita GDP (PGDPLCU) between 1970 and 
2001. Average growth rate is calculated from per capita GDP in local currency constant 






T = , where YT is the per capita GDP at the 
end of the sample (for most countries in 2001) and Y0 at the beginning of the sample (for 
most countries 1970).
4 T is then merely the length of time in years. The WDI database also 
provides most of the other economic variables used. Several different measures of raw 
material dependency are utilised in the analysis. The average share of primary good 
exports in GDP (PRIMGDPAVE) is often used in analysis, and here it is supplemented 
with the share of food (FOODGDPAVE) and fuel (FUELGDPAVE) exports in GDP. In 
Sachs and Warner (1997), the share of primary exports in the beginning of the sample is 
used. However, we prefer to use the whole period; resource dependency may vary sub-
stantially over the years and using a single observation in time may give misleading 
results.
5   Several potential political and institutional variables could be used in the analysis. 
For example, one might plausibly claim that political and civil liberties influence long-term 
growth. Civil liberties are also often correlated with economic freedoms. In the absence of 
such freedoms, innovation is stifled and growth impaired. Civil liberties and political free-
dom may themselves be conducive to growth, as well as good indicators of the general rule 
                                                 
4 If per capita GDP for 1970 is unavailable, the first year when per capita GDP is available is used. If per 
capita GDP is unavailable for any year before 1980, observation is dropped. We are interested in the deter-
minants of medium to long-term growth, so a too-short sample period is unacceptable. 
5 Correlation between the initial and average primary export shares in our sample is 0.47. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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of law. On the other hand, political freedoms can lead to higher demand for redistributive 
policies. Higher transfers require higher taxation, which may cause inefficiencies in the 
economy, lowering its long-term growth potential. Freedom House has calculated and pub-
lished since 1972 indices of civil liberties (CL) and political rights (PR) for a large number 
of countries (Freedom House, 2003). We use these indicators in the empirical exercise.
6 In 
addition, Marshall and Jaggers (2003) have constructed a very large database of political 
indicators, POLITY IV. From this database, we utilise the variable POLITY relating to the 
nature of democracy in various countries.
7 
There are a number of other political variables spanning our data sample. Further 
political variables are due to Beck et al. (2001). They have collected a very large compara-
tive database on political institutions, covering 177 countries from 1975 to 1997. Although 
the years do not exactly correspond to our data sample, the overlap is surely large enough. 
The variables describe different aspects of elections, electoral rules, types of political sys-
tem, party composition of the government and opposition coalitions, and the extent of mili-
tary influence on government. There are also a number of measures of various checks and 
balances, and political stability. Unlike many other datasets of political indicators, DPI 
variables are not subjective. Also, the DPI database has several variables relating to the 
fragmentation of the political field. As the theory does not make clear a priori which vari-
able best describes polarisation of political opinions or the political field, we include sev-
eral variables in our initial estimations. FRAC is the probability that two deputies picked at 
random from the legislature will be from different parties. At one extreme FRAC=0, and 
there is no polarisation of political opinions (except within the one party represented in the 
legislature). At the other extreme FRAC=1, and all the deputies come from different par-
ties. Presumably, such a legislature would be very divided and uncertainty concerning fu-
ture policies could be high. On the other hand, some fragmentation of political arena may 
                                                 
6 More specifically, we will utilise the first principal component of the indicators. Correlation of civil liber-
ties and political rights is very high (0.97), so including the individual variables is a bad idea. The first prin-
cipal component (PC1) explains 98.45% of the variation in the indices. In the construction of PC1, the index 
of political rights is weighted by 0.37 and civil liberties by 0.41. Indices of political freedom and civil liber-
ties run from 1 to 7 with 1 indicating the highest level of freedom. To illustrate, in 2003 Australia scored 1 on 
both accounts, while Azerbaijan had a 6 in political freedom and a 5 in civil liberties. Australia was classified 
as free; Azerbaijan as not free. 
7 POLITY ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). POLITY is constructed from 
sub-indices relating to the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on chief execu-
tive and competitiveness of political participation. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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be beneficial, as it can reflect liberties more generally.
8 Fragmentation of political life may 
also have different effects in different political systems. Therefore, we also experiment 
with an interaction term, multiplying POLITY by FRAC. 
 
 
4  Estimation results 
 
We report our main empirical findings in this section. We start with simple conditional 
growth models and then increase their complexity by adding indicators of resource de-
pendency and political system. We pay close attention to the robustness of the results.  
 
4.1  Baseline regressions 
 
We first estimate a very basic conditional convergence regression, where growth of per 
capita GDP is explained by initial per capita GDP, average investment ratio and average 
enrolment at the secondary school level (it would not matter much if primary school en-
rolment is used, correlation between the two variables is 0.92). A planned economy 
dummy (PLANDUMMY) is used for countries that had command economies in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
9 In the first regression, all variables have the expected signs and are strongly 
statistically significant (Table 1, column I). For example, in a sample of 106 countries, we 
can detect conditional convergence of per capita GDP between 1970 and 2001. In the re-
gressions of Table 1, the coefficient on initial income varies from -0.77 to -0.92. They are 
somewhat smaller in absolute value than e.g. the coefficients obtained by Sachs and War-
ner (1995). 
Next, we turn to the issue of resource dependence. As explained before, there are 
several potential indicators of raw material dependence. In our first stab at the data, we use 
                                                 
8 A similar index, GOVFRAC, can be constructed for the government coalition. The variable HERFTOT is 
calculated in the same manner as the ordinary Herfindahl index for the total legislature. HERFTOT is the 
sum of squared shares of all parties in the legislature. With HERFTOT, a smaller value is associated with 
more fragmented legislature. The DPI database contains Herfindahl indices for the government coalition (and 
opposition). The corresponding Herfindahl index for government coalition is HERFGOV. Adding these vari-
ables to the regressions does not add anything beyond FRAC, and consequently these results are not reported. 
9 Without the dummy, some of these countries would be fairly large outliers. There are two economic reasons 
for including this dummy: Having a socialist system most probably retarded growth, but this explanation is 
not within the current growth theoretic framework. Moreover, when the formerly socialist economies started 
their transition towards a market economy, almost all experienced large reductions in recorded output (some-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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the share of primary sector exports in GDP as an indicator of resource dependence. In ef-
fect, this regression replicated the initial results of Sachs and Warner, but with twelve more 
years and a few more countries.
10 Also, we use the average share of primary sector exports 
in GDP for the sample period. As noted, resource dependency seems to fluctuate consid-
erably for many countries from year to year (partly because of volatility of the raw material 
prices), so using the initial value is not appropriate. Share of primary sector exports is 
negatively associated with long-term growth in our sample of 106 countries. Variables in 
column II of Table 1 seem to explain 0.53 of the variation in per capita GDP growth rates. 
Residuals of the regression are normally distributed, and there are no large outliers. 
Now we turn our attention to the effects of our political and institutional variables 
on long-term growth. Sachs and Warner used an index measuring the quality of the bu-
reaucracy between 1980 and 1983, taken from Mauro (1995), as an indicator of institu-
tional quality. If institutional quality changes little over the years, using data from one 
point in time is quite acceptable. Over three decades, however, political systems inevitably 
change, and these changes obviously affect e.g. the quality of bureaucracy. The transition 
of previously socialist countries to market-based systems in the early 1990s is an obvious 
example. Another example is South Korea, which was a largely autocratic country with 
severely limited civil and economic liberties at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1972, Free-
dom House classified South Korea as “not free.” By 1987, Korea’s classification had 
moved via “partially free” to “free.” By 2003, South Korea’s political freedoms and civil 
liberties were approaching the level of most other OECD countries. Several countries have 
undergone comparable changes in their political systems. Such changes need to be taken 
into account when devising the institutional and political proxies. Therefore, we use aver-
ages over the three decades when constructing our political and institutional variables. 
Just adding POLITY to the regression in column III seems to indicate that, ceteris 
paribus, more democratic systems grow faster. The coefficient of POLITY is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. To illustrate the significance of this indicator of democracy for 
per capita growth, we note that its standard deviation is 6.63. Therefore, increasing democ-
racy by one standard deviation of the sample would increase average per capita GDP 
growth by 0.34 percentage points. However, adding POLITY to the baseline regression 
                                                                                                                                                    
times 30% or even 40%) of pre-reform levels. Also this “transformational recession” is outside the frame-
work of the current exercise. 
10  In later specifications, the number of countries in Sachs and Warner drops quite drastically. This is not the 
case in our exercise. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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causes the coefficient of primary goods’ export share to lose its statistical significance (t-
value is now 1.52), although it remains negative. We also experimented with adding the 
variable POLITY as squared, but it did not come in as significant. 
When we replace POLITY with the first principal component of Freedom House 
indices of political rights and civil liberties indices (PC1), it appears that they are posi-
tively correlated with growth.
11 This is an interesting result. Some previous studies find 
that expanding political rights are associated with slower growth, the intuition being that in 
more democratic states electorate will demand higher level of budget transfers, which leads 
to higher level of taxation. High taxation, in turn, depresses growth. In our exercise, how-
ever, political rights enhance growth. They may be correlated with broader economic free-
doms and stable rule of law, which should encourage investment. Unlike with POLITY, 
including these institutional variables does not cause the coefficient on primary good ex-
ports to lose its statistical significance and it remains negative. All other variables remain 
statistically significant and have the same signs as before. 
We next address the effect of political fragmentation on economic growth. It turns 
out that by itself FRAC has a positive coefficient in growth regression of column V, but it 
is not statistically significant. Coefficients on our basic growth determinants (initial per 
capita GDP, investment ratio, secondary school enrolment and planned economy dummy) 
retain their signs and remain statistically significant, as does the coefficient on primary 
good exports. However, multiplicative interaction term between POLICY and FRAC is 
marginally significant, and appears to contribute positively to growth. Again, our basic set 
of growth determinants retains its significance, while the coefficient on primary good ex-
ports, although negative, loses its statistical significance. It may be that the effect of this 
interaction term is due more to the effect of democracy variable than political fragmenta-
tion itself. If POLITY, FRAC and their interaction term are all added to the regression at 
the same time, none is statistically significant. 
Because inclusion of several political and institutional variables seems to decrease 
the statistical significance of the primary good export variable, it may be that the negative 
growth effect of resource dependency works mainly through political system. The coeffi-
cient on education also decreases sharply when primary goods variables are included. 
These results could suggest that the effect of resource dependency on growth has two 
                                                 
11 Again, the Freedom House indices run from 1 to 7. The higher the value, the less rights and liberties people 
in that country enjoy. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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channels of influence: the political system and education. For the effect on political sys-
tem, the hypothesis that rent-seeking is intensified may be appropriate. For education, 
higher raw material wealth may depress the relative returns on education and innovation 
when high-paying jobs are available in the raw material sectors. This issue is taken up in 
subsection 4.3. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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Table 1.  Baseline growth regressions, resource variable share of primary good exports in GDP 
 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 












































































POLITY    0.0510341* 
(0.03081) 
   
PC1        -0.288148* 
(0.1490) 
   





          0.0784625* 
(0.04172) 
N  106 106 96  105  103  95 
R
2  0.55  0.53  0.53  0.54  0.53  0.54 
Log-
likelihood 





0.6970  0.5029  0.5797  0.9037  0.8090  0.7212 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
 
However, it may be that different raw material endowments have different effects on 
growth. For example, it has sometimes been argued that economies based on mineral re-
sources are more prone to rent-seeking behaviour (Perälä, 2003). Prevalence of rent-
seeking behaviour may distort incentives in other parts of the economy, leading to lower 
investment in physical and human capital, and consequently to lower growth. Therefore, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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we try to differentiate among natural resources. The WDI database provides information 
on food and fuel exports, which allows us to examine separately the effects of these pri-
mary goods on growth. We construct two new variables NONFUEL and NONFOOD, 
which denote the share of primary good exports other than fuel and food in GDP. Table 2 
report results from this exercise. 
Reassuringly, portioning primary good exports into different components barely af-
fects the estimated coefficients of other variables. Their statistical significance levels are 
also unaffected. However, the effects of raw material endowments on growth do seem to 
vary. First, portioning primary goods into fuel and non-fuel component suggests that the 
non-fuel component contributes more to negative growth. Moreover, its coefficient is sta-
tistically significant in all the regressions involving political variables (which is not the 
case with overall primary goods).
12 The same applies when primary goods are portioned 
into food and non-food categories. These results suggest that the growth-retarding effect of 
natural resources may be due to other categories besides food or fuel. When looking at our 
World Bank data in more detail, it seems that lower growth is associated with large relative 
export shares of metalliferous ores, non-ferrous metals, wood, pulp and a number of 
smaller items.
13 This would be in line with the reasoning that at least some extractive in-
dustries succumb more readily to rent-seeking behaviour, which in turn is detrimental to 
long-term growth. 
The political variables are statistically significant when primary goods are divided 
into fuel and non-fuel components. Higher level of democracy is clearly associated with 
faster growth, regardless whether we use POLITY or PC1 as the variable. However, when 
primary goods are divided differently, i.e. into food and non-food, the political variables 
lose their statistical significance, although the estimated coefficients retain their signs.   
                                                 
12 Regressions involving FRAC and FRAC*POLITY are not reported to save space, but statistical signifi-
cance survives in those regressions as well.  
13 Primary good exports have been constructed by subtracting manufacturing exports (SITC classes 5-8, with 
the exception of SITC class 68, non-ferrous metals) from total exports. Fuel exports consist of SITC class 3, 
while food exports are defined as SITC classes 0, 1, 4, as well as 22 (oil seeds and oleaginous fruits). Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
 
  22 
Table 2. Baseline growth regressions, resource variables differentiating between food and fuel exports 
 
  I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
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POLITY    0.0695100** 
(0.03405) 
    0.0297950 
(0.03587) 
 
PC1     -0.397736** 
(0.1690) 
  -0.181794 
(0.1763) 
N  106  96  105  106  96  105 
R
2  0.53  0.54  0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 




0.5149  0.7146  0.9773 0.4839 0.5028 0.7727 
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4.2  Alternative specifications 
 
In this subsection we examine the robustness of the results derived in section 4.1, utilising 
other indicators of resource dependence. We also again check that the results do not de-
pend on a small number of outlier countries.
14 
A World Bank project attempts to assess the total wealth of some hundred countries 
in terms of human capital, produced assets and resource wealth. For more details about the 
way the data are collected and wealth estimated, see Kunte et al. (1998). The data for vari-
ous forms of wealth refer to 1994, which is slightly problematic.
15 Use of the data in cross-
country analysis is warranted where we can establish that the relative share of various 
forms of wealth has not changed drastically between 1971 and 2001 in the countries we 
study. First, we use the share of natural capital in total capital. The maximum value of the 
ratio NATW is 0.79 in Niger. In many Western European countries NATW is close to 
zero, as the produced assets and human resources figure predominantly in their total na-
tional wealth. Kunte et al. also provide estimates for values of various raw material stocks, 
including oil, metals and coal. 
To check the robustness of our results, we replicate the growth regressions from 
columns II-VI of Table 1, replacing the share of primary good exports in GDP with 
NATW. For starters, the dummy for planned economy must be dropped, as it cannot be 
estimated precisely when NATW is included. Results of the regressions are reported in Ta-
ble 3. By and large, results reported in Table 1 are confirmed when another indicator of 
resource dependence is used. As before, we observe conditional convergence among the 
countries. Growth is positively associated with investment in physical assets and human 
capital. Higher initial per capita GDP lowers subsequent growth. When NATW is included 
in the baseline growth regression alone or with POLITY, its coefficient is negative and sta-
tistically significant. To offer an illustration about the effects of natural resource wealth on 
growth, we can note that the average share of resource wealth in total wealth in our sample 
is 0.26, and its standard deviation is 0.21. Increasing the share of resource wealth by one 
standard deviation would lower a country’s expected per capita growth rate by 0.355 per-
centage points. The coefficient of POLITY is positive and statistically significant. Again, 
the first principal component of Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties indices 
                                                 
14 Statistical tests in subsection 4.1 already indicated that outliers were not a problem. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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is negatively correlated with growth, meaning a higher level of political rights is beneficial 
for growth, although the coefficient of NATW is not statistically significant. These robust-
ness checks indicate that our earlier results do not depend on the exact indicator of re-
source dependence. 
We next replace NATW with various other natural wealth indicators, i.e. oil, metal 
and natural gas wealth. By themselves, none of these comes in significant. The most likely 
reason is that there are only a handful of countries where the share of, say, oil wealth is 
significantly different from zero. Nevertheless, differentiating between non-oil and oil 
wealth does change the results a bit. For example, when we replace NATW with a variable 
that takes out the oil wealth from resource wealth, NONOILW, PC1 remains negative and 
statistically significant. POLITY remains positive. Although oil wealth is not statistically 
significant when included in the regression reported in columns VI and VII of Table 3, re-
sults would suggest that having non-oil resource wealth is detrimental to growth, but oil 
resources, ceteris paribus, do enhance growth prospects (at least relative to other types of 
natural resources). Again, this is in line with the results of previous subsection. 
 
Table 3. Robustness check, share of resource wealth in total wealth  
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15 In their empirical analysis, Gylfason and Zoega (2001, 2002) use the share of national wealth in the total 
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POLITY   0.057284* 
(0.03325) 
    0.06381** 
(0.0328) 
 
PC1      -0.3129* 
(0.1738) 
      -0.3513** 
(0.1713) 
FRAC     0.401801 
(0.6632) 
    
FRAC 
*POLITY 
        0.0766378* 
(0.04569) 
   
            
N  87  84  87  86  83  84  87 
R
2  0.59 0.62 0.60 0.60  0.63  0.63  0.61 
Log-
likelihood 





0.3322 0.3093 0.6910 0.3566  0.3362  0.2502  0.6042 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
 
Our next robustness check concerns the potential engoneneity of political variables. It may 
be that the level of democracy a country achieves is affected by the growth rate of the 
economy. For example, a country with a very low growth rate may be more prone to politi-
cal unrest, which may lead to curtailment of political rights. To take into account the pos-
sibility of endogeneity of level of democracy, we also run our regressions with the initial 
values of Freedom House’s indicators (or, more precisely, the first principal component of 
the initial values of PR and CL, PC1INI).
16 The results are reported below in Table 4. Alt-
hough the initial level of political and civil rights (proxied by PC1INI) is positively corre-
lated with subsequent growth, it is statistically significant only in the specification where 
natural resources are divided into fuel and non-fuel components. As the level of democracy 
and political rights change substantially in many countries of our sample, the initial level 
of PC1 probably has little value in explaining economic growth for all subsequent years.  
 
All the other variables retain their expected signs. Moreover, share of primary good ex-
ports in GDP is statistically significant. When raw material exports are assessed in greater 
detail, non-fuel and non-food exports are again negative and statistically significant in ex-
plaining growth. Therefore, we can consider this result quite robust.  Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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Table 4. Robustness check, initial political conditions  
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PRIMGDPAVE  -0.025454** 
(0.009919) 







NONFUELGDP    -0.03038*** 
(0.01143) 
 
FUELGDP   -0.0144010 
(0.01612) 
 
NONFOODGDP      -0.037078*** 
(0.01244) 
FOODGDP    -0.00777441 
(0.01518) 
N  106  106  106 
R
2 0.54  0.54  0.55 
Log-likelihood  -170.649  -170.241  -169.395 
Normality test, Chi
2, p-value  0.5746  0.6324  0.5022 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
Our final robustness check concerns the data sample itself. Although no large outliers 
could be detected in the regression reported in Table 1, it is possible that our results are 
unduly influenced by a handful of countries with special characteristics. Several countries 
in our sample have very high resource dependency when measured by share of primary 
good exports in GDP. Quite predictably, highly developed economies score low on this 
                                                                                                                                                    
16 The first principal component accounts for 93% of variation in the two variables. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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indicator. To assess whether our results are due e.g. to a handful of countries with very 
high degrees of resource dependence, we drop the countries with highest GDP shares from 
our sample. Any cut-off point is bound to be arbitrary, but we choose to leave out countries 
where the share of primary good exports in GDP is higher than 44% (Libya’s level). Thus, 
almost all the oil-producing countries around the Persian Gulf are excluded, as well as 
small countries like the Seychelles and the Bahamas. In Table 5, we report results from this 
exercise.  
In most regressions the sample does not change very much. Many of the smaller 
countries have missing observations for a large number of variables, and therefore they do 
not influence the results of subsection 4.1 in any case. It turns out that omitting the OPEC 
countries hardly affects the results. This is quite reassuring when assessing the robustness 
of our results. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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Table 5. Robustness check, sample where the countries most dependent on resources have been dropped  
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POLITY    0.0752182** 
(0.03373) 
   
PC1        -0.444625*** 
(0.1613) 
   





          0.100442** 
(0.04338) 
       
N  99  99  90  98  96  89 
R
2  0.52 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.58 
Log-
likelihood 





0.5321 0.5393 0.7219 0.9596 0.8422 0.8575 
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4.3  Channels of influence 
 
In this subsection, we discuss the channels through which natural resource abundance may 
have affected growth. Based on results of subsection 4.1, education and political system 
appear to be the two main channels. Therefore, we assess the impact of resource depend-
ence on the secondary school enrolment ratio and our political variables by estimating 
simple cross-section regressions. We then regress the average investment on resource de-
pendency. Results from these regressions are reported in Table 6a. Finally, we again at-
tempt to differentiate among types of natural resources. We duplicate the regressions with 
fuel and non-fuel export shares, as well as with food and non-food shares. These regres-
sions are reported in Table 6b. 
First, resource dependency appears to lower a country’s chances of being democ-
ratic (regressions where POLITY and PC1 are dependent variables).
17 Resource abundance 
also lowers educational attainment, although this result is not statistically significant. On 
the other hand, investments seem to benefit from higher level of primary good exports in 
GDP.
18 These results lend support to the hypothesis that natural resource dependence leads 
to rent-seeking as producers try to influence political decision-making. Education also 
seems to suffer from the resource curse. However, these simple regressions are not entirely 
convincing from a statistical standpoint. The R
2s remain low and the error terms are not 
normally distributed.  
 
                                                 
17 Please keep in mind that a higher POLITY score means a higher level of democracy, while higher PC1 
score means less political and civil rights. 
18 We also experimented with adding PRIMGDPAVE squared. It was not statistically significant. Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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INVAVE  POLITY  PC1 

















       
N  122  142  117  141 
R
2 0.01  0.08  0.09  0.03 




0.0000 0.1269  0.0000 0.0002 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
 
A more nuanced picture emerges when the type of resource endowment is taken into ac-
count. It seems that share of non-fuel primary good exports in GDP is negatively associ-
ated with educational attainment. This has an indirect negative effect on growth. On the 
other hand, where POLITY and PC1 are the dependent variables, the results suggest that 
dependence on fuel resources is definitely detrimental for democracy, political rights and 
civil liberties. This negative effect on democracy and political rights has an indirect detri-
mental influence on growth. The same is true if non-food primary good exports are used. 
However, this negative effect is mitigated by the fact that higher fuel endowment is associ-
ated with higher investment ratio. The results remind us that a natural resource endowment 
may have indirect effects on growth in addition to the direct effects estimated in the sub-
section 4.1. To get an idea of the size of these indirect effects, we calculate the effect of 
fuel export share on growth via POLITY and INVAVE using the baseline regression III 
from Table 1 and all the relevant regressions in Table 6b, where FUELGDP is included. 
The standard deviation of FUELGDP in our sample is 13.34. Increasing fuel dependency 
by one standard deviation would lower POLITY score on average by 2.759 (=13.34*(-
0.2068)), and increase investment ratio by 1.60 percentage points (=13.34 * 0.11972). Tak-
ing coefficient values from regression III in Table 1, this would eventually increase per 
capita GDP growth rate by 0.17 % [=(-2.759 * 0.05103) + (1.60 * 0.19292)]. Obviously, BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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this calculation is highly tentative. Regressions in Table 6b have low R
2s, and a number of 
them have large outliers. 
 






































FUELGDP  0.183908 
(0.2177) 
  -0.207*** 
(0.05138) 
  0.1197*** 
(0.0387) 













FOODGDP    -0.4287 
(0.2985) 
  0.01684 
(0.06871) 
  0.1036*** 
(0.0502) 
  -0.007296 
(0.01134) 
         
N  135  137  115  117  140  142  139  141 
R
2  0.04 0.02 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.07 
Log-
likelihood 





0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 0.0001 0.1032 0.1369 0.0004 0.0013 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we examined the effect of natural resource dependency on growth in the 
presence of different political systems and freedoms. With our large dataset of more than 
100 countries, we confirmed the finding of many previous studies that higher natural re-
source dependency is associated with lower economic growth. On the other hand, we also 
established that a higher level of democracy contributes positively to economic growth in 
the presence of resource dependency. The results did not depend on the exact nature of the 
indicator for resource dependency used or on observations of a few outlier countries. We Iikka Korhonen              Does democracy cure a resource curse? 
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also were able to delve into the issue of resource dependency using more detailed trade 
data. The data suggested that food and fuel exports had no direct negative effect on eco-
nomic growth, but rather that the presence of fuel wealth negatively affects democracy, as 
well as political and civil liberties.  
Moreover, education levels tended to be lower in countries with high fuel exports. 
On the other hand, fuel-dependent countries also had higher investment ratios, which com-
pensated for the lower level of democracy and education. Dependence on metal ores, in 
particular, seemed to have a direct negative effect on growth, but this effect could be alle-
viated with more democratic political systems and a greater political freedom. 
Our results indicate that countries with large natural wealth endowments are not 
necessarily condemned to sub-par economic growth. Indeed, certain types of natural re-
sources may even contribute positively to growth. Three policy conclusions deserve men-
tion: 
 
  Negative growth effects of certain natural resource types can be counteracted with 
institutional and political reforms.  
  Allowing greater political freedom and moving towards a more democratic political 
system improves a country’s long-term growth potential.  
  Fostering education can partly counteract negative growth effects.  
 
Obviously, implementing large-scale (or even incremental) political changes is a difficult 
process. In resource-dependent countries such reforms can be especially difficult, because 
limited political freedoms are a fairly common feature of fuel-intense economies. Never-
theless, several countries have succeeded in dealing with ample natural resource wealth 
and gone on to build functioning democracies. These states should provide a useful 
benchmark for other resource-rich countries. 
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